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19 July 1955

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HEMORAHUM FOR: Director of Training

SUAJECT:

Certain observations concerning the Clark

Committee Report on CIA.

1. Pursuant to your request, made during the Director's meeting with the ADs yesterday. I am attempting in this memorandum to set down on paper the gist of certain observations which I have made to the top staff of the DD/F area concerning the Clark Committee Report. Although this has all been kept on an oral basis, I briefed the staff and requested them to brief others downward in the chain of command, for the express purpose of putting to rest some exaggerated and rather alarmist notions and rumors which were gaining currency as the result of the press handling of the Clark Committee Report.

- The Glark Committee findings, conclusions and recommendations, taken collectively and in the whole, are by no means as adverse and derogatory as some newspaper reporters and columnists would lead one to believe. Most, if not all, of the adversely critical material in the secret reports were included in the published report; but much of the favorable and landatory material in the secret reports was omitted from the published report. Some writers who are apparently unfriendly to the Agency have seized upon portions of the published material and have enlarged upon it, quoted passages out of context, and otherwise managed to create the impression that the Agency was found egregiously wanting and taken heavily to task by the Clark Committee. On the basis of the very thorough analysis which has been made of the portion of the report dealing with the Clandestine Services, their personnel and operations, I would say that there are no criticisms of such an exaggerated or apparently hostile character that we cannot live with them, and that there are in fact some very favorable findings and conclusions which tend to give the report a considerable degree of balance. Two or three of the recommendations having to do with organization will presumably not be found feasible or otherwise acceptable, especially those which are regarded as calling for retrograde steps.
- 3. The portion of the report from which we can draw the greatest amount of satisfaction and encouragement is the finding and conclusion which substantially vindicates the Agency with regard to the McCarthy-type charges of Communist infiltration and subversive design. The Clark Committee goes about as far as could ever be expected of any investigating committee in the direction of giving the Agency a clean bill of health. An almost equally important finding of a favorable

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character is that which certifies to our apparent regularity as regards the expenditure of unvouchered funds. In fact, if the report contained no other favorable elements than those relating to these two extremely critical points, we would have such to be thankful for, since it is in precisely these areas that the most serious charges have been hurled against the Agency and any appreciable measure of sulpability would be most devastating. In order to appreciate fully the significance of these findings, the following points should be borne in mind:

- a. Twice within a very short space of time the Clandestine Services have been thoroughly investigated and in each case although the approach and metivation were different we have some off clean and whole;
- b. Although the Doolittle Committee was suspected by some of being friendly and generally well-disposed toward the Agency, there is no doubt that the group of hard-working individuals who made up that committee called their shots as they saw them, and would have considered it their duty to the President and to the public to point out all inadequacies, and worse, which they might have found;
- c. Whatever else may be said of the outlook and orientation of the Clark Committee, certainly no one, repeat NO OHE, has ever suggested that its purpose was to "whitevesh" the Agency if anything a contrary impression was created by certain statements and actions on the part of the Chairman which became matters of public knowledge, vis., the published report of his having called upon and solicited advice from Senator McCarthy, and the more or less public solicitation of any and all adverse information concerning CIA and its personnel; and
- d. The fact that all enemies of the Agency and people with special axes to grind were given full opportunity by the Clark Committee to be heard, with the result that just about every "dead cat" that could be thrown was, in fact, cut loose at us but without appreciable adverse effect in so far as this can be determined from the contents of the report.

It is submitted that under the circumstances the personnel of this Agency are entitled to feel very reassured and, in fact, proud to belong to an organization which has so successfully withstood the acid test of these unprecedented investigations. I consider that

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we are entitled to hold our heads high and to indulge ourselves in a modest amount of self-congratulation. Certainly there is no longer any reason for the personnel of this Agency to feel that the Agency is under the gum or required to offer applopies.

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FRANK O. VISHER Deputy Director (Plans)

ce: DCI IG C/OP

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